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The Perils of Theory Policing 
When commentators flag discourse as promulgating conspiracy theories, they are, in 
effect, characterizing it as an intellectually bankrupt, prejudicial attempt to 
philosophize about socio-historical phenomena that are infinitely more complex and 
aleatory than such rigid paradigms give them credit for. This epithet has the 
unfortunate side effect of circumscribing such accounts as unworthy of more serious 
philosophical consideration about the media environment we inhabit and the array 
of positions that we might assume within it.1 
Perhaps the most notorious information age conspiracy theory of the 
moment is QAnon, a byzantine, messianic truther echo-system that has recently 
irrupted into mainstream public consciousness. QAnon derives its name from “Q,” a 
lurid, putatively omniscient avatar purporting that Donald Trump is furtively at war 
with a satanic, sex-trafficking, election-fixing cabal lurking beneath the liberal 
establishment. In order to engage with QAnon as a cultural phenomenon, I will first 
probe the rhetorical coordinates of the popular concept of conspiracy theories 
through optics provided by Kenneth Burke and Jodi Dean. My article puts these 
understandings of conspiracy theories into conversation with John Durham Peters’ 
pioneering account of witnessing as a rhetorical phenomenon bound up with the 
complex mediation of testimony, authority, and perspective. Drawing on recent 
media scholarship by Carrie Rentschler and Jonathan Sterne, I then examine 
QAnon discourse as a misguided activist modality of witnessing precipitated, in no 




In “The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories,” Karen Douglas, Robbie M. Sutton, and 
Aleksandra Cichocka aver that there are three more or less Maslowian motives that 
tend to orient people towards conspiracy theories. The first motive is “epistemic,” 
which is bound up with “understanding one’s environment” and achieving a measure 
of certainty in an uncertain world. The second is “existential,” the need to “be safe 
and in control of one’s environment.” The final category is “social,” the drive to 
maintain “a positive image of the self and the social group.”2 This social drive is the 
primordial impetus to seek out community support, friendship, and solidarity. Not 
 
1 See Kenneth Burke, “The Virtues and Limitations of Debunking,” The Southern Review 3, no. 4 (1938): 
640–56. 
2 Karen M. Douglas, Robbie M. Sutton, and Aleksandra Cichocka, “The Psychology of Conspiracy 
Theories,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 26, no. 6 (2017), 539. 
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incidentally, this quasi-instinctual drive to seek and maintain validation tends to 
encounter dissonance and contortions in caustic social media ecosystems. 
Interestingly, the authors do not go to great lengths to define conspiracy 
theories, which they merely characterize as “explanations for important events that 
involve secret plots by powerful and malevolent groups.”3 This passing definition 
calls for a closer examination of the very question of definition, as it pertains to 
conspiracy theories, since the examples they proffer are quite heterogeneous at the 
level of content and social sanction. The first example is the belief that “global 
warming is a hoax.” In this instance, the scientific consensus on global warming has 
been attacked and undermined, in large part, by bad-faith agents, such as the 
petroleum lobby and its deep-pocketed allies. There is, nonetheless, a wealth of 
scholarly and journalistic evidence that the more verifiable conspiracy has been the 
mass-polluting petroleum industry’s covert plot to stigmatize the environmental 
movement as indulging in mere conspiracy theories.4 
In the case of their second example, the popular assertion that Lee Harvey 
Oswald did not act alone in his assassination of President John F. Kennedy, the 
coordinates of witnessing, accusation, and legitimacy are quite disparate from the 
corporate propaganda orchestrated to undermine the scientific consensus on 
anthropogenic climate change. Mainstream filmmakers like Oliver Stone and 
countless esteemed scholars from across the political spectrum have poked holes in 
the credibility of the Warren Commission’s officially-sanctioned account of John F. 
Kennedy’s assassination. To this day, there is little agreement among experts or the 
general public on a working hypothesis that could ultimately explain who hatched 
the plot, how many conspirators were involved, and why they did so. There is not 
even a measure of agreement about who qualifies as an expert on this scandal. Yet 
most Americans are able to dwell with the constitutive uncertainty about the truth 
of this matter without committing to the assertion that one or another cabal is 
necessarily culpable. 
In spite of the rhetorical disparities between these two examples, there are 
some integral common threads. Both of these “theories” are primarily narratives that 
involve alleged nefarious plots to perform misdeeds and deceive the general public 
about matters central to the citizenry’s understanding of its political environment. 
Each of these narratives also endeavours to resolve and metabolize an intractable 
 
3 Ibid. 
4 See Benjamin Franta and Geoffrey Supran, “The Fossil Fuel Industry’s Invisible Colonization of 
Academia,” The Guardian, March 13, 2017. 
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nexus of ambiguity about opaque and labyrinthine matters of immense political 
import. 
Historian Geoffrey Cubitt avers that most conspiracy theories are narrative 
efforts to cognize broad-sweeping historical events according to a reductive logic of 
intentionalism, dualism, and occultism. Intentionalism speaks to the fact that 
conspiracies are perceived to be a function of sinister intentions brought to fruition; 
they are effective far-reaching plots to engage in diabolical activities, and there are 
ostensibly no coincidences when it comes to decoding their intricacies. “Viewed 
from this angle,” Cubitt observes, “conspiracy theories are about [clear] causes.”5 
While intentionalism entails reducing the complexity of cause and effect, dualism 
radically simplifies ethical complexity. A dualistic approach to political matters 
conjures a Manichean conspiratorial universe that is sliced into the evil agents who 
perpetrate conspiracies, their innocent victims, and those who are placed in the 
position of bearing witness. The third category, occultism, refers to the belief that 
conspiracies necessarily operate under a cloak of secrecy and are obscured from 
plain-view. “Any conspiracy theory,” writes Cubitt, “involves a claim to provide 
access to a reality which is, by its nature, hidden.”6 From a psychological viewpoint, 
the strategies that Cubitt adumbrates serve the simultaneously existential and 
epistemic purpose of reducing the complexity, resolving the ambiguity, and 
smoothing over the contradictions of a world to which we necessarily have 
extraordinarily limited forensic access. If conspiracy theories radically simplify the 
world of cause and effect to create the illusion of ethical clarity, this leads to vital 
questions about the rhetorical and mediatic catalysts that trigger these schemas in 
the first place. 
 
We Have Never Been Meta 
The epistemic ambiguity that inheres to the attribution of conspiracies is fascinating 
to rhetoricians because it is the purview of rhetoric “to study and clarify 
the resources of ambiguity.”7 The manner in which our internally-inconsistent 
symbolic universe produces ruptures and contradictions behooves rhetorically-
minded theorists to observe “the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily 
arise”8 in order to influence a course of events and their interpretation. Nebulous 
circumstances necessarily precipitate uncertainty, which, in turn, opens onto 
 
5 G. T. Cubitt. “Conspiracy Myths and Conspiracy Theories.” Journal of the Anthropological Society of 
Oxford 20, no. 1 (1983), 14. 
6 Ibid., 16. 
7 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945), ix. 
8 Ibid. 
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multiple possible tributaries of persuasion about how we should interpret and 
respond to them. For Burke, we never arrive at a distantiated plateau of critical 
distance from our symbolic milieu and its intractable ambiguities. We are, rather, a 
symbol-using animal that is always put in the slippery position of having to not only 
“interpret the character of events . . . [but] also interpret our interpretations.”9 This 
simulacral quandary places denizens of modernity in the unfortunate predicament of 
having to scrutinize and integrate irremediable scandals and ruptures in our 
symbolic ether into our primordial relationship with the world. 
On the thorny issue of the symbol-using animal’s pulsion to theorize about 
conspiracies hiding beneath the surface of vertiginously complex networks of 
influence, Burke observes that what one observer of social cohesion describes as 
innocuous cooperation is another’s nefarious conspiracy: 
Sovereignty itself is conspiracy. And the pattern is carried into every 
political or social body, however small. Each office, each fraternal 
order, each college faculty has its tiny conspiratorial clique. 
Conspiracy is as natural as breathing. And since the struggles for 
advantage nearly always have a rhetorical strain, we believe that the 
systematic contemplation of them forces itself upon the student of 
rhetoric.10 
Riffing on the etymology of “conspire,” which literally means “breathing together,” 
Burke’s line of thinking is replete with import when it comes to interpreting the 
communicative atmosphere that permeates our twenty-first century media 
environment. The attribution of conspiracy is, after all, one of many possible 
orientations one may adopt when construing disturbing activities that take place 
within noisy, complex social systems. Oftentimes, one observer’s imputation of a 
malign plot appears to another witness as co-inspired cooperation or even mere 
happenstance.  
I propose that, rather than endeavouring to zero in on a correct definition of 
conspiracy theory, perhaps a more fruitful line of inquiry would entail attending to 
the entangled rhetorical, ecological, and medial atmospheres that generate 
conspiracy-imputing attitudes towards the ambiguous, withdrawn, inscrutably 
complex networks that vehiculate our lives. In other words, a media-archaeological 
approach to conspiracy theory may be less a matter of psychology than one of what 
media scholar John Durham Peters calls “infrastructuralism,” the understanding of 
media as dispersed, often ambient, “infrastructures that regulate traffic between 
 
9 Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose (University of California P, 1935), 6. 
10 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (University of California P, 1950), 166. 
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nature and culture.” In a particularly timely passage that seems to speak to the 
infrastructural vicissitudes of our present circumstances, Durham Peters writes, 
“[Media] play logistical roles in providing order and containing chaos. This view of 
media is not just a metaphor, but a reflection of current conditions. The question of 
media arises against a background of biological crisis and communication 
overload.”11 
 
From Psychology to Infrastructuralism 
One implication of Durham Peters’ infrastructural framework is that media 
environments necessarily serve as primary conduits for ecologies and economies that 
wildly exceed our cognition and agency. As rogue amplifiers of the epistemic, 
existential, and social turmoil that may impel us towards conspiracy theories under 
conditions of “biological crisis and communication overload,” our digital media 
bubbles are adroit at engendering paranoia about incursions on our sense of agency 
and relevance. On the infrastructural impetus of contemporary conspiracy theories, 
Jodi Dean writes, 
As the global networks of the information age become increasingly 
entangled, many of us are overwhelmed and undermined by an all-
pervasive uncertainty. Far from passively consuming the virtually 
entertaining spectacles of vertically integrated media, we come to 
suspect that something is going on behind the screens. What we see 
is not what we get. The truth may not be out there, but something, 
or someone, is. Accompanying our increasing suspicions, moreover, 
are seemingly bottomless vats of information, endless paths of 
evidence.12 
Dean’s appreciation of the abyssal, amorphous quality of the Internet leads her to 
advocate for a shift in the theoretical emphasis. Instead of castigating the personality 
defects of outlandish conspiracy theorists, she argues for understanding the 
proliferation of conspiracy theories as an unsettling feature, rather than a bug, of the 
same discourse networks onto which we project our residual Enlightenment 
fantasies of progress, meaningful dialogue, and education. 
Through Dean’s theoretical prism, the Internet figures as less of a quaint 
Habermasian public sphere than its seductive and cacophonous simulacrum. This 
heady telecommunicative brew, afforded by a “strange merging of democracy and 
 
11 John Durham Peters, “Infrastructuralism,” in Traffic: Media as Infrastructures and Cultural Practices. 
Eds. Marion Näser-Lather & Christoph Neubert. (Leiden: Brill/Rodopi, 2015), 31. 
12 Jodi Dean, “Theorizing Conspiracy Theory,” Theory & Event 4, no. 3 (2000). 
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capitalism,” is conducted through increasingly dense and pervasive digital networks. 
Referring to this infrastructural matrix as “communicative capitalism,” she contends 
that many of the key attributes of traditional notions of democracy “take material 
form in networked communication technologies.” For example, writes Dean, “Ideals 
of access, inclusion, discussion, and participation come to be realized in and through 
expansions, intensifications, and interconnections of global telecommunications.”13 
The coupling of such incommensurable bedfellows puts egalitarian ideals on a direct 
collision course with the profit mandates and propaganda of corporate oligopolies. 
Insofar as it makes sense to understand the Internet as infrastructure for 
opportunistically “merging” traditional ideals of democratic participation in the 
public sphere with the voracious accumulative drives of digital capitalism, social 
media figure as a powerful ideological locus of these disparate streams. Functioning 
as strange attractors of longstanding democratic ideals and volatile markets, social 
media platforms still, paradoxically, often manage to resonate in a fashion that 
sustains the Fukuyamist fantasy of the harmonious participation of the 99% within 
the circuits of a privatized global village owned tout court by the 1%. 
From a standpoint that both Silicon Valley visionaries and right-wing 
corporatists would likely unite in labelling as paranoid, Dean underscores the 
infrastructural perniciousness of communicative capitalism as it inheres to the 
circulation of democratic values through social media: “When linked to new media, 
democracy tags a politics lite that anyone can get behind . . . and that is especially 
attractive to purveyors of mobile phones, notebook computers, software, and social 
media platforms.”14 As such, democracy has been reduced to a “marketing slogan” for 
Facebook, Twitter, and AT&T. Since the 1990’s, “participatory media has offered 
quick, easy, universal democracy: anyone with a mobile phone or access to the 
internet can make her voice heard.”15 Dean’s nuanced vision of communicative 
capitalism conjures a world in which the social media networks that online activists 
traverse are programmed to remediate their political aspirations into a more 
alluring armchair pantomime of the slow-moving, ponderous work of “real-world” 
activism they are supposed to vehiculate. 
The ultimate contradiction of this digital environment is that “it incites 
voice, engagement, and participation only to capture them in the affective networks 
of mass personalized media.”16 This all-too-common misrecognition of one seductive 
 
13 Jodi Dean, “Communicative Capitalism: This is What Democracy Looks Like,” RCL Journal of 
Communication and Languages 51 (2019), 33. 
14 Ibid., 33. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 34. 
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brand of social media utterance as another more impactful mode of engagement 
leads many to succumb to a perspectival delusion about the efficacy of their tweets 
and shares. “Shared ideas and concerns,” she writes, “are conceived less in terms of a 
self-conscious collective than they are as viruses, mobs, trends, moments, and 
swarms. Channeled through cellular networks and fiber optic cables, onto screens 
and into sites for access, storage, retrieval, and counting, communication today is 
captured in the capitalist circuits it produces and amplifies.”17 Thus, Dean claims 
that any approach to activism that fetishizes the positive role of social media is at 
risk of merely feeding back into and propping up the mesmeric platforms that 
afford and conduct it. Of course, from the standpoint of the attention-monetizing 
platforms, all spectacles and communications that keep eyes glued to flickering 
screens are to be encouraged. This is why she insists that the movement, not the 
medium, is the message. 
 
Cloning Legitimacy 
Much has been made of the fact that the Greek term theoria originally signified 
“witnessing a spectacle.” The Athenian philosopher, writes Andrea Wilson 
Nightingale, “gazes with the ‘eye of the soul’ upon divine and eternal verities. In its 
most extreme form, which is articulated by Aristotle, theoria is hailed as a 
contemplative activity that is completely ‘useless’ . . . in the world of human affairs.”18 
Seemingly excavating this philological sense of the term, contemporary conspiracy 
theories are bound up with the act of witnessing within the spectacle-producing 
ecosystem of communicative capitalism. But the architecture of the thoroughfares 
that conspiracy theorists inhabit induces a particularly maladaptive admixture of 
certainty and skepticism towards the mediated acts of witnessing that social media 
platforms, image boards, and video-hosting sites seems to encourage. 
Levelling her gaze on the 9/11 truth movement as a departure from previous 
modalities of conspiracy thinking, Dean characterizes this conspiracy theorizing 
community as “symptomatic of a larger sociocultural development that involves a 
new constellation of questioning, doubt, credibility, and certainty”19 pertaining to 
our capacity to both recognize expertise and dwell with irresolvable ambiguity. The 
circulation of social media narratives affords “[a] volatile mix of certainty and 
skepticism” in place of an authoritative “official story” about who colluded in the 
 
17 Ibid. 
18 Andrea Wilson Nightingale, “On Wandering and Wondering: ‘Theôria’ in Greek Philosophy and 
Culture,” Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics 9, no. 2 (2001): 23. 
19 Jodi Dean, Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke UP, 2009), 148. 
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terrorist plot and what actually transpired behind the scenes presented in the 24/7 
cable news cycle.20 
What fascinates Dean about this new twist—engendered by the increasing 
traction of deracinated social media discourse within the densifying circuits of 
communicative capitalism—is the extent to which 9/11 truther discourse manifests 
itself as an uncanny doppelganger of officially-sanctioned university scholarship and 
journalism. Drawing on what Jacques Lacan has termed “the university discourse,” 
the proliferation of knowledge produced and disseminated by the likes of academics 
and journalists, Dean points to 9/11 truthers’ approach to witnessing the 
hypermediated scandal of 9/11. Like a great deal of university discourse, the 9/11 
truth movement mobilizes an avalanche of real and imagined facts: “Purporting to 
let the facts speak for themselves, the 9/11 truth movement is structured in 
accordance with the university discourse. Yet it lacks it authorizing support.”21 There 
is no officially-sanctioned textbook or authoritative expert witness when it comes to 
the conspiratorial “truth” of the “inside job.” The movement assumes the role usually 
(at least in theory) occupied by academia and the press in providing the raw feed 
about occult networks bent on political corruption and unthinkable malevolence. 
Dean suggests that this lack of pervasive institutional support renders 
academia’s wayward, paranoid double into a more precarious “clone of university 
discourse, a psychotic clone.”22 Here, she employs the term “psychosis” in a non-
pathologizing Lacanian sense. It refers, here, to the social texture that emerges from 
a lack of overriding authority to consolidate the symbolic field in which all denizens 
of modernity participate. In other words, from a Lacanian standpoint, we denizens 
of media modernity are all variably psychotic insofar as psychosis inheres to our 
socio-symbolic fabric. Since the Bush administration proved incapable of providing 
a coherent narrative about the Manichean battle of democracy against terror, the 
9/11 truth movement rejects official accounts and “builds a discourse around the hole 
that is left. A response that is psychotic in its formal structure.”23 Such psychotic 
discourse is inherently unstable and must, like a discursive virus, latch onto other 
discourses: “To hold its speculations together,” writes Dean, “this psychotic discourse 
models itself on other, more conventional discourses such as university discourse.”24 
Combining a psychotically “intense certainty” about the presence of a 
particular conspiracy (or cluster of conspiracies) with “overwhelming skepticism” 
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based on analyses of the facts, the 9/11 truth movement “renders all that comes into 
contact with it suspect, uncertain, [and] permeated with possible meaning.”25 For 
Dean, this particular “psychotic cloning” of university discourse is exemplary of a 
perverse tendency of a media milieu defined by communicative capitalism. The 
impetus to engage in activist media scholarship is all-too-readily driven off the rails 
of meaningful political participation and warped through the psycho-tropic26 gravity 
fields of a social media environment that systemically “increase[s] the likely 
proliferation of such psychotic clones.”27 “What sort of politics is possible,” Dean 
asks, “when there is knowledge without belief, when certainty and skepticism exist 
in tandem, each supporting but immune to each other? And what does any answer 
to this question entail for aspirations to collective approaches to equity and 
justice?”28 
 
Witnessing and its Malcontents  
In keeping with Dean’s account, QAnon discourse fluctuates between the declarative 
“psychotic” register of certainty and the interrogative scholarly register of ceaseless 
skepticism. “Q Drops,” Q’s communications to followers through imageboards like 
4Chan and then 8Chan, tend to vacillate between assertions made from a seemingly 
omniscient perspective and questions soliciting “researchers” to question the official 
story. The first Q Drop, on October 28, 2017, reads, “Hillary Clinton will be arrested 
between 7:45 AM - 8:30 AM EST on Monday - the morning on Oct 30, 2017.”29 
However, as Clinton’s supposed moment of truth approached, Q’s subsequent drops 
began to create wiggle room for belief in her current or imminent demise to persist 
in spite of evidence to the contrary: 
POTUS is 100% insulated - any discussion suggesting he’s even a 
target is false. POTUS will not be addressing nation on any of these 
issues as people begin to be indicted and must remain neutral for 
pure optical reasons . . . . 
What SC decision opened the door for a sitting President to activate 
- what must be showed? [sic] 
 
25 Ibid., 152 
26 I employ this term in its etymological sense of “to turn the mind,” which I want to bring into 
resonance with the narcotic (i.e., psychotropic) potentials of the Internet, the socio-symbolic 
understandings of psychosis theorized by Dean and Burke, and the pivotal role of tropes, or literary 
devices, in patching together psychotic fantasies. 
27 Ibid., 151 
28 Ibid., 152. 
29 Anonymous, “Calm Before the Storm,” /pol/, 4Chan, October 28, 2017. 
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Why is POTUS surrounded by generals ^^ [sic] 
Again, there are a lot more good people than bad so have faith. 
This was a hostile takeover from an evil corrupt network of players 
(not just Democrats).  
Don’t fool yourself into thinking Obama, Soros, Roth’s [sic], 
Clinton’s [sic] etc [sic] have more power present day than POTUS.30 
A proper analysis of the individual conspiratorial threads that hold together Q’s 
symbolic tapestry would require a book-length treatment. Nevertheless, we can draw 
attention to the fact that they are numerous. QAnon seems to function as a sort of 
mega conspiracy theory, a seething cauldron that gathers evil-doers such as the 
Rothschilds, Clintons, Obamas, and George Soros into an echo-system of COVID-19 
hoax, 9/11 truther, Kennedy assassination, and anti-vaccination conspiracies (among 
others). The dystopian “evil corrupt network” is vast, and the QAnon discourse 
network is a bottomless reservoir seemingly designed to contain it. But there is also 
a countervailing utopian investment in Trump, who figures as a messianic world-
rectifying figure in this onto-theology, which culminates in an Armageddon-like 
“Storm” of reckoning for the conspirators. The maelstrom will be followed by a 
“Great Awakening” of Enlightenment that will engulf the scene to reroute the course 
of American history. 
Q’s interrogative statements do more than galvanize skepticism about 
conventional narratives. They also buttress the declarative utterances by creating the 
impression that Q, the consummate insider and subject-supposed-to-know, grasps 
why precisely things are not as they seem; and this includes compensating for the 
increasingly clear reality that Hillary Clinton had not, in fact, been arrested or 
otherwise directly impacted by Q’s allegations of criminal malfeasance. Behind the 
scenes, “Patriots are in charge,” claims Q. “Sit back and enjoy the show.” 
Widespread faith in President Trump’s manifest destiny to snuff out the 
Clinton cabal’s malfeasance (ranging from election-tampering to child-trafficking to 
election-stealing) was vigorously sustained by a community of “online soldiers” all 
the way until election day, when Biden assumed the office of President without 
impediment and Donald Trump retreated more-or-less ignominiously into the 
background. Rather than ushering in a revolutionary conflagration, Q finally began 
to run out of steam. The phantom insider’s credibility butted up against its own 
contradictions and shattered into a million pieces for even many of the most 
devoutly faithful to see. But the scope and scale of QAnon should awaken media 
 
30 Ibid. 
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theorists and concerned observers to the fascistic theological longing that will 
continue to crackle within the circuits of communicative capitalism. Any 
contemporary update of cultural literacy education worth its salt will have to 
download this affair and think through the extent to which our communicative 
environment lends itself to weaponized mimetic contagion. 
 
Diabolos Ex Machina  
Internet disinformation researcher Kate Starbird admonishes readers that, “contrary 
to popular framings, belief in conspiracy theory ‘alternative narratives’ does not 
imply mental illness, but is instead indicative of a[n] ‘[impaired] epistemology’ due in 
part to a limited number of information sources.”31 Her research suggests that this 
diminution of our access to information 
may be exacerbated by the false perception of having a seemingly 
diverse information diet that is instead drawn from a limited 
number of sources. This understanding of the dynamics of 
alternative media, where the same content appears on different sites 
in different forms, combined with what we know about how 
believing in one conspiracy theory makes a person more likely to 
believe [in others], suggests that alternative media domains may be 
acting as a breeding ground for the transmission of conspiratorial 
ideas. In this way, a ‘critically thinking’ citizen seeking more 
information to confirm their views about the danger of vaccines may 
find themselves exposed to and eventually infected by other 
conspiracy theories with geopolitical themes, with one conspiracy 
theory acting as a gateway to others.32 
Starbird’s conclusions suggest that an updated approach to infrastructural literacy 
will have to take into account the mirages that emerge out of deceptively narrow 
research pathways. The rabbit holes that she conjures can be understood as socially 
pathological because they are simultaneously infinitely connected and oppressively 
confining (especially when they are not perceived as such by the researcher). 
Computer scientist and former Google design ethicist Tristan Harris lends 
weight to Starbird’s analyses and contends that QAnon is, in many ways, a next-level 
Golem-like emanation out of Facebook’s infrastructural affordances. After 
researching Facebook’s recommendation tendencies, Harris insists that once a user 
 
31 Kate Starbird, “Examining the Alternative Media Ecosystem Through the Production of Alternative 
Narratives of Mass Shooting Events on Twitter,” Proceedings of Proceedings of the Eleventh 
International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media (Montreal, 2017), 238. 
32 Ibid. 
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shows interest in a conspiracy theory, “Facebook groups cross-recommend other 
conspiracy theories” because “the algorithms that optimize for engagement can’t 
distinguish between healthy, conscious, wise thoughtful engagement and essentially 
radicalizing, alienating, and isolating people from their families.”33 The pre-eminent 
concern of Facebook’s machine-learning recommendation infrastructure is 
maximizing eyeball-time on the screen. Whether these ocular wetware channels are 
taking in family photos or conspiracy theories about a Clinton sex ring is 
immaterial. “To Facebook’s algorithm,” claims Harris, “it’s the same thing, as long as 
it increases the amount of engagement.”34 
Functioning much more like an acephalic Cambridge Analytica 
disinformation campaign than a neutral archive, the QAnon juggernaut has emerged 
out of a certain culture of bearing witness within a persuasive environment that has 
taken on an undead life of its own. Users who enter the algorithmic wind tunnel 
with a passing interest in anti-vaccination discourse or chemtrails may pop out on 
the other side as an evangelizing member of the QAnon research corps, or the like, 
bent on spreading the news about the Clinton sex-trafficking ring or the fabrication 
of the COVID-19 “plandemic” by shadowy agencies. 
It may be too late to put the headless genie back in the bottle. Although 
Facebook and Twitter have recently pledged to increase their vigilance towards 
QAnon and other conspiracy communities, Starbird suspects that such palliative 
measures are likely too little, too late. These platforms, she claims, “helped QAnon 
grow, providing tools to build their networks, aided by recommendations and 
system-gaming tactics. The infrastructure of QAnon is now massive and redundant. 
Those networks (follower relationships, FB groups) are baked in[to] the 
‘organization’ of QAnon.”35 QAnon will not simply evaporate and, even if it did, new 
mega-conspiracy theories will nonetheless emerge to take its place, as will an 
increasingly unpredictable array of algorithmic cultural accidents. What’s more, 
there is no good reason to believe that Google and Twitter censors (be they human 
or algorithmic) will be astute at distinguishing “psychotic” conspiracy theories from 
justifiable accusations against powerful corporations and individuals (which will 




33 Tristan Harris, interview with Travis View, “Your Undivided Attention,” podcast audio, July 8, 
2020, https://www.humanetech.com/podcast/21-the-world-according-to-q. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Kate Starbird, Twitter post, August 11 2020, 7:38 a.m., 
https://twitter.com/katestarbird/status/1293195168741339141?lang=en. 
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Reorienting Toward a Mediology of Witnessing and Reactivism 
So much about the proliferation of conspiracy theories hinges on the manifold 
mediation of witnessing. John Durham Peters observes that the noun “witness” is 
inherently “intricate” in that it involves all three nodes of the rudimentary rhetorical 
triangle: “(1) the agent who bears witness, (2) the utterance or text itself, (3) the 
audience who witnesses.” Encompassing everything from the religious “inward 
conviction” about the truth to the journalistic “privileged (raw, authentic) proximity 
to the facts,” a witness, he writes, “can be an actor, an act, a text, or an experience.”36 
The infinitive “to witness” is similarly polysemic:  
To witness can be a sensory experience – the witnessing of an event 
with one’s own eyes and ears. We are all, constantly, witnesses in this 
sense simply by virtue of finding ourselves in places and times where 
things happen . . . . But witness is also the discursive act of stating 
one’s experience for the benefit of an audience that was not present . 
. . . Witnesses serve as the surrogate sense-organs of the absent . . . . A 
witness is the paradigm case of a medium: the means by which 
experience is provided to others who lack the original.37 
Commenting on Durham Peters’ pithy account of the mediatic dimensions of this 
much-overlooked rhetorical term, Carrie Rentschler concludes that “witnessing is a 
form of participation, through mass mediation, in others’ suffering.” This leads her 
to speculate that “the meaning of witnessing may shift from that of the particular 
(first-person) experience of the survivor toward the more generalized experience of 
the media spectator.”38 
Alternative narrative discourses like QAnon bring to light the multifaceted 
mediality of witnessing in the digital age. Within a suasive social media echo-system 
constituted by platforms aggressively jockeying for our attention, media navigators 
are ceaselessly prompted by the ubiquitous witnessing function of social media to 
bear witness and react to the injustices that have been observed on their behalf and 
presented to them as exigencies. Like Dean, Rentschler views this nexus as one 
crackling with political consequences and crises of legitimacy. Such acts of 
witnessing, she writes, constitute “important political moments that hail us as 
citizens, and not just media consumers.”39 She therefore argues “that the 
commemorative function of witnessing is also a political act, but one not recognized 
 
36 John Durham Peters, “Witnessing,” Media, Culture & Society 23, no. 6 (2001), 709. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Carrie A. Rentschler, “Witnessing: US Citizenship and the Vicarious Experience of Suffering,” 
Media, Culture & Society 26, no. 2 (2004), 298. 
39 Ibid., 299. 
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as political” because of its many valences. “[M]edia scholars have some responsibility 
to study the explicitly political uses of paying witness to suffering.”40 But this is a 
prohibitive task: 
People who pay witness through the news are positioned as passive 
consumers. Stories of past atrocity, for instance, may enable their 
hearers to empathize with distant victims, but they often do not tell 
their listeners how to turn empathy into usable knowledge in the 
present . . . . The news may call us to help our fellow human beings in 
the present, but if people do not perceive themselves as accountable 
for others’ suffering, they will not be mobilized to act.41 
In accordance with Rentschler’s account, QAnon and Pizzagate adherents are 
activated by a media environment that interpellates witnesses into a form of 
activism that we might term reactivism, the misguided quasi-activist reaction to 
deceptive representations of atrocities. This reactivism is, through Rentschler’s lens, 
a direct consequence of the rhetoricity of witnessing within a media milieu that 
intensely responsibilizes us but does “not give us a clear picture of how to be 
responsible for what we see.”42 
Much of QAnon activity entails the participation in online communities 
that interpret both Q’s drops and other devotees’ contributions (on social media, in 
videos, etc.) to this line of inquiry. In her essay in the bestselling QAnon community 
anthology An Invitation to the Great Awakening, Liberty Lioness valorizes her network 
of “citizen journalists, researchers who dig into the historical record and educate us, 
plus the decoders who help us read between the lines combined with the ability to 
make memes gives us a unique form of power.” She describes her community as 
“people with vision and passion who have grown tired of deception and criminality, 
and who work together to communicate the truth” of these scandals. Lioness 
concludes, rather jarringly, that the activist Qmmunity has “invented, in effect, a 
new form of media.”43 
“Where We Go One, We Go All” is a call for solidarity. If accounts such as 
Liberty Lioness’ are to be taken seriously, such fidelity to the perceived truth of 
QAnon reverberates as an exemplar of what Alain Badiou characterizes as a 
“simulacrum” of a revolutionary Event. As Badiou observes, pseudo-revolutionary 
 
40 Ibid., 300. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Liberty Lioness, “The Power of Memes,” in An Invitation to the Great Awakening, eds. Captain Roy D 
& Dustin Nemos (Dallas: Relentlessly Creative Books, 2019), 105. 
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ruptures can mimic some of the trappings of solidary revolutions even while 
militating against their most integral egalitarian potentials. Unlike the socialist 
revolutions of 1792 or 1917, writes Badiou, the Nazi “National Socialist” simulation of 
an emancipatory Event was “faithful only to the alleged national substance of a 
people” and “addressed only to those that it itself deem[ed] ‘German’.”44 Importantly 
for Badiou, the Nazi valorization of a German communitarian substance was 
antithetical to the kinds of emancipatory struggles that it aped because “this 
substance is not an ‘everyone’ but, rather, some ‘few’ who dominate ‘everyone’.”45   
QAnon is not an intrinsically fascist movement per se. But insofar as it functions as 
a pseudo-Event organized around making America great again, the Q phenomenon 
certainly harbours a weak fascistic power, whose potentials a more competent 
authoritarian leader would have better exploited to their advantage. As algorithmic 
modernity unfolds, Lioness’ “new form of media” can be counted on to continue 
mobilizing reactivist fulmination against hallucinated subterranean campaigns of 
deception and criminality for some time to come. 
 
Psycho-Tropes of Certainty  
The economy of witnessing circulated by and through Lioness’ discourse network 
manifests itself in an array of reactions. On December 4, 2016, Pizzagate follower 
Tim Welch was ready to put an end to the Clinton atrocities. After become fixated 
on the widely-circulated narrative that the Clintons were operating a child sex ring 
out of Washington, DC, pizza restaurant Comet Ping Pong’s basement,46 Welch 
brought an AR-15 rifle to the restaurant in order to investigate for himself and, 
presumably, rescue the children. Although he fired several shots in the restaurant 
(without injuring anyone), he quickly discovered that Comet Ping Pong had no 
basement, and there were no abused children to be found. He then turned himself in 
to the police. “Four years later,” writes Michael Miller, “thousands of people would 
follow Welch’s fevered path to Washington, drawn from across the country by an 
ever more toxic stew of disinformation and extremism, including Pizzagate’s 
 
44 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (London: Verso, 2001), 73. 
45 Ibid., 74.  
46 In keeping with Bessner and A’Lee Frost’s analysis, I want to draw attention to this pervasive 
narrative about the profligate mistreatment of unprotected innocents by corrupt elites. This 
potent psycho-trope radiates out of the obscene decadence of contemporary American liberal 
democracy. The Comet Ping Pong fantasy about the sadistic abuse of vulnerable “bare life” 
resonates as a warped transfiguration of Dean’s analysis of a decadent political-economic system 
whose elected representatives impudently serve and recreate with the 1% at the demos’ expense. 
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successor: QAnon. This time, instead of a pizzeria, they would target the U.S. 
Capitol.”47 
Commenting on the large, heterogenous cohort of Q faithful who 
participated in the Capitol Hill onslaught, Daniel Bessner and Amber A’Lee Frost 
scrutinize the cultural fabric of the constellation of aspiring activists that seems to 
have coagulated around Q: 
[Q] adherents don’t share economic interest, culture, or even a 
political program. Rather, many people joined Q because of their 
alienation and disconnection from a system they view as illegitimate. 
To provide their ever-more precarious lives with meaning and an 
explanation for American decline, Q adherents congealed under a 
series of bizarre Internet conspiracy theories that unite a right-wing, 
anti-elitist, but nevertheless authoritarian sensibility that is 
organized around narratives that link pedophilic cabals, racism, 
antisemitism, fears of “cultural Marxism,” Satanism and, of course, 
absolute faith in the singular, salvific, and millenarian figure of 
President Donald J. Trump.48 
Bessner and A’Lee Frost view QAnon as a somewhat hapless misrecognition of a 
spectacularized cascade of atrocities that seem to radiate out of America’s twenty-
first century autoimmune spasms: the so-called War on Terror, the 2007/8 financial 
meltdown, the ever-widening gulf between the wealthy and the poor, and the 
pervasive “feeling of impotence in a political system that was supposed to be a 
democracy.” To add insult to injury, the pandemic has acted as an accelerant on 
these ongoing exigencies: “[a]ll of these anxieties, of course, have been recently 
compounded and exacerbated by a pandemic, lockdown, and an economic recession 
that predictably witnessed an explosion in QAnon proselytes.”49 
Characterizing QAnon as part-cult, part-misguided reactivist movement, 
they conclude that “QAnon-ers embrace conspiracy theories because unlike the 
Republican or Democrat narratives, the stories they tell provide meaning in 
dislocated lives. In essence, QAnon tells people who believe in America that a cabal 
has stolen their country from them, and that faith in a charismatic leader is the only 
way to redeem it (and, ultimately, redeem themselves).”50 The religious turn to the 
 
47 Michael E. Miller. “Pizzagate’s Violent Legacy,” Washington Post, Feb 16, 2021, 
http://thewashingtonpost.newspaperdirect.com/epaper/viewer.aspx. 
48 Daniel Bessner and Amber A’Lee Frost, “How the QAnon Cult Stormed the Capital,” Jacobin, Jan 
19, 2021, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/01/q-anon-cult-capitol-hill-riot-trump. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid.  
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auratic figure Donald Trump, the sovereign figure divinely anointed with the task of 
filling the hole in the symbolic order, betokens the movement’s umbilical cord to the 
rent in the universe Dean echolocates in her analysis of the 9/11 truth movement. 
Indeed, if Max Weber were alive today, he would likely single out QAnon as the 
spiritual corollary to communicative capitalism. As such, the QAnon pseudo-Event, 
which is bound up with the intractable impediments to witnessing and progressive 
social change in algorithmic modernity, will not evaporate as a result of any 
Habermasian campaign to expunge disinformation and misinformation. If anything 
is to be gleaned from the free-floating weaponization of data that Starbird and 
Harris describe, it is that all information is potential malignformation when 
conducted through machine-learning labyrinths engineered to sustain and monetize 
our rapt attention.51 
 
From Witnessing to Intervention 
In “What is an Intervention?” Jonathan Sterne articulates the simultaneously 
theoretical and practical contours of scholarly-activist interventions. A great deal of 
his analysis dwells on the questions of how to move meaningfully from witnessing 
potentially hypermediated injustices to responding to them in a world without 
certain analyses or outcomes. He proposes, appropriately provisionally, that an 
intervention 
is simultaneously a political and intellectual act. It can be individual 
or collective. It is undertaken with intent, with consciousness of 
context and possible outcomes, and from a specific institutional and 
cultural position. It is itself theorized though it may not appear to 
be. Interventions have expiration dates, and while they can move 
from place to place, they are never universally applicable. They are 
conjunctural. Interventions do not come with guarantees.52 
Sterne’s ethical appreciation of the fraught complexity of the socio-symbolic order 
entails a tenuous balancing act between the understanding that the world is full of 
injustices that call for our meaningful engagement, on the one hand, and the 
absolutely critical recognition that both our assessments and our interventions may 
fall short or even backfire, on the other. 
 
51 See Lisa Gitelman and Virginia Jackson, introduction to “Raw Data” is an Oxymoron, ed. Lisa 
Gitelman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), 1–14. As Gitelman and Jackson observe, there is no 
neutral, “uncooked” data. All data are rhetorically motivated by the networks they traverse and the 
machine-learning processes that conduct them. 
52 Jonathan Sterne, “What is an Intervention?” TOPIA: Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies 37, March 1, 
2018, 6. 
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His evaluation of the fragile stakes of interceding in the world leads Sterne 
to assert that a great deal about the outcome of an intervention hinges on one’s 
attitude towards enmity. “[W]hen academics take political stands,” he writes, 
they can easily degenerate into nothing more than performances for 
other academics . . . . Denunciation is predicated upon assumptions 
of shared knowledge and agreement where they may not exist, 
overriding the messiness and complexity of lived conjunctures. We 
are supposed to analyze, describe and reimagine those conjunctures . 
. . . [Thus,] we should be very wary of a politics that begins by sorting 
into “us” and “them.” This is not a call for empathetic dialogue with 
racists, but rather a demand that our politics must not, in the first 
instance, be about naming friends and enemies.53 
By refusing to take the polarizing Manichean bait of descending into 
denouncements, “hot takes,” or troll wars, academics and concerned researchers of 
every stripe create the opening for potential new plateaus of critique, understanding, 
and coalition-building. In other words, insofar as it makes sense to broach the idea 
of something like the opposite of a maladroitly certain and skeptical conspiracy 
theory, I might go out on a limb and say it is something like Sterne’s notion of an 
intervention “without guarantee.” 
The unavoidable downside of Sterne’s heuristic strategy, which is 
nonetheless a necessary one, is that it does little to ameliorate the epistemic and 
existential uncertainty that nudges many would-be interveners in the direction of 
conspiracy theories in the first place. The refusal to simulate certainty may even 
exacerbate our sensitivity to the vibrating tectonic plates shifting beneath our feet. 
Many well-intentioned individuals gravitate towards conspiracy theories out of an 
ethical impulse to make our corrupt, confusing world a more just, intelligible, 
meaningful place. Since our media environment is never a neutral atmosphere, 
aspiring researchers must be equipped with sufficient infrastructural literacy to 
salvage their ethical impulses before they are conducted through conspiratorial 
wormholes that propel them into spasmodic simulations of political intervention. 
 
A Different Kind of Clearing 
Just as QAnon can be understood as the uncanny double of an egalitarian activist 
project, so too can the “Great Awakening” be appreciated as the hapless 
doppelganger of the drive for Enlightenment. Aufklärung, the original German term 
for Enlightenment, is, after all, cognate with the idea of clearing and clarification. 
 
53 Ibid., 9. 
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For Kant and his ilk, Enlightenment was an arc of history meant to elucidate matters 
of concern through the employment of better, more rational pedagogical 
instruments. If there is sufficient merit to exhuming the project to extricate 
humanity from its “self-incurred immaturity,”54 we will have to update and reformat 
our cultural techniques to account for previous blind spots and the exigencies of the 
world in which we now find ourselves. 
Above and beyond emphasizing the deployment of reason over passive 
dependency on moribund authorities, promulgators of infrastructural literacy will 
need to supplement and recalibrate the somewhat dated Kantian formula. One 
necessary component will have to be an updated public program of scientific 
literacy, with special emphasis on educating the general public about the 
prodigiously positive role of uncertainty in scientific endeavours. Far from turning 
on irrefutable truth claims about objective reality (as, for example, some anti-
vaccination propaganda would have it), scientific projects are propelled by the 
ceaseless drive to refute working hypotheses and, indeed, everything that we think 
we know about the world.55 Scientific methods are far from infallible or immune to 
conspiratorial corruption, but they deploy an infinitely more nuanced, reflexive, and 
powerful approach to solving problems pertaining to climate change and global 
pandemics than anything the Qniverse has to offer. 
Still, writes Badiou, “[B]rutal obscurantist preachings present themselves as 
the simulacra of science, with obviously damaging results. But in each case, these 
violent damages are unintelligible if we do not understand them in relation to the 
truth-processes whose simulacra they manipulate.”56 Part of the appeal of Q is the 
pretense to mastery of an unmasterable field and the presentation of magical 
panaceas to profound problems. Scientific literacy can help inoculate the psyche 
against the temptations of false certainty. In good science, as in all good theory, 
writes Simon Critchley, “There is no God’s eye view . . . . Errors are inextricably 
bound up with pursuit of human knowledge, which requires not just mathematical 
calculation but insight, interpretation and a personal act of judgment for which we 
are responsible.” This sense of sacred responsibility radiates out the fact that science, 
 
54 Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? (1784),” trans. James 
Schmidt, in What Is Enlightenment?: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions, ed. 
Schmidt James, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 47. 
55 See Kostas Kampourakis and Kevin McCain, Uncertainty: How it Makes Science Advance (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2020). 
56 Badiou, Ethics, 77. 
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like Sterne’s intervention, calls for and cultivates a mature “toleration of 
uncertainty”57 in spite of our deep-seated drive to extinguish it. 
The next pillar is rhetorical literacy. As Burke insists, countless rhetorical 
pulsions undulate just the below the surface of any lifeworld organized around 
processing irresolvable ambiguities and uncertainties. Thus, any contemporary 
approach to rhetorical literacy must be subtended by an awareness that the ability 
to distinguish provisionally robust authorities from deceptive agencies is often 
fraught with peril. When it comes to one’s algorithmically-contoured informatic diet 
and the political stakes of witnessing, media navigators will have to be equipped 
with constantly-ramifying strategies for assessing the evidence we are presented, the 
authority of those who witness on our behalf, our feelings about the spectacles we 
witness, and our own agency within the rabbit holes that we find ourselves plunging 
through. 
The third pillar is algorithmic literacy. This intervention must bring into 
relief the ever-evolving propensities of the persuasive technologies that hold us in 
their thrall and launch us towards oversimplified, affectively-contorted conclusions 
about the beguiling world we inhabit. These unfortunate reductions of complexity, 
animated by a strange admixture of ratiocinative sedation and phantasmagoric 
frenzy, can and will culminate in conspiratorial echo-systems. Because these 
mediatic nexuses both mimic and viciously militate against the possibility of broader 
community, activism, and a better world, they will have to be received by political 
imaginations equipped to recognize and contend with their “baked-in” tendencies. 
We will also need to engineer new digital agoras that stave off some of the more 
malign, weaponizable aspects of our digital dwelling space. After all, if Q can 
reinvent the Internet, so can we. 
The final pillar is what Burke might call prejudicial literacy. And this 
educational mode may well be a synecdoche for the entire intervention. Prejudicial 
literacy would underscore the perniciousness of humanity’s historical and ongoing 
predilection for prejudices based on arbitrary criteria like race, class, and gender. 
For Burke, such reified mischaracterizations of human character tend to draw from 
the same epistemic reservoir as conspiracy theories: both of these narrative strategies 
fetishistically fix the world so as to clarify otherwise inscrutable complexity and 
ambiguity. 
 
57 Simon Critchley, “The Dangers of Certainty: A Lesson From Auschwitz,” The Stone, Opinionator 
Blogs, New York Times, February 2, 2014, https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/02/the-
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Like Dean, Burke zeroes in on opaque economic, technological, and 
ecological circumstances as prime movers of psychotic certainty. He employs the 
phrase “occupational psychosis”58 to refer to a fossilized experience of one’s 
surroundings that, for any number of reasons, proves inadequate to the vicissitudes 
of the world it encounters. A psychotic orientational lifeworld is a “way of seeing,” 
remarks Burke, that “is also a way of not seeing—a focus on object A involves a 
neglect of object B.”59 He notes that post-World War II America is afflicted by such 
“marked instability”60 that specific regimes of orientational training readily flip over 
into a kind of “trained incapacity” when applied to a different environment or the 
coordinates of their existing environment metamorphose. When this happens, 
people’s “past training [causes] them to misjudge their present situation. Their 
training has become an incapacity.”61 
Burke proffers a number of thanatopolitical allegories to conjure the 
lifeworld of the disoriented occupational psychosis. One of the most disturbing and 
evocative is the trope of the rat placed in an electrified maze by a cruel experimental 
psychologist. When the vivisectionist electrocutes the rat for navigating the maze in 
one fashion or another, “the conditions of the experiment . . . do not enable the rat 
to perceive the experimenter’s part in the enterprise at all.”62 Just as the abused rat 
responds in a “pathological,” seemingly irrational manner to the electrical shocks 
that suddenly seem to erupt spontaneously out of their otherwise enemy-free mazes, 
Burke avers, people often foolishly misrecognize the provenance of their confusion 
and suffering at the hands of a callous, volatile world. 
One such maladaptation in bound up with worldviews predicated on racism. 
Because of the ease with which the racist gaze can single out racialized minorities, 
intensely prejudicial imaginations will unreflexively fall back on “scapegoating” them 
for opaque societal ills. Describing this worldview as the product of a crude psycho-
social algorithm that draws on an impoverished data set, Burke underscores the 
extent to which racism is often the by-product of a pervasive trained incapacity to 
process the overriding socio-economic and ecological processes that actually exert 
power over our lives. While refusing to exculpate racist behaviour, he claims that 
punishment is usually inadequate (and maybe even counterproductive) to the task of 
disabusing disoriented people of trained incapacities that tilt into racist 
 
58 Burke mobilizes a now obsolete sense of the term “psychosis” to mean something like a lifeworld or 
pronounced experience of the world. Interestingly, his deployment of the concept (which he 
attributes to John Dewey) resonates with Dean’s Lacanian sense of the term. 
59 Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change (Berkeley: University of California P, 1935), 49. 
60 Ibid., 32. 
61 Ibid., 10. 
62 Ibid., 15. 
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scapegoating: “If people persist longer than [abused lab animals] in faulty orientation 
despite punishment,” he writes, “it is because the greater complexity of their 
problems, the vast network of mutually sustained values and judgements, makes it 
more difficult for them to perceive the nature of the re-orientation required, and to 
select their means accordingly.”63 As Stuart Hall urgently framed the matter in the 
early 1980’s, “[W]e hardly begin to know how to conduct a popular antiracist 
struggle or how to bend the twig of racist common sense which currently dominates 
popular thinking. It is a lesson we had better learn pretty rapidly.”64 
In what should be understood as a critique of naïve faith in the unambiguous 
arc of Enlightenment, Burke claims our symbolic environment frequently functions 
less as the instrument of self-emancipatory reason than a vehicle of technological 
rationality gone off the rails, a kind of second-order instinct that has lost sight of its 
proper telos along the way and orients the symbol-using animal towards all kinds of 
incapacitation and confusion. He asserts that bewildered symbol-using animals often 
default to this moribund second-order instinct out of habit and myopia: “the very 
authority of their earlier ways interferes with the adoption of new ones. And this 
difficulty is increased by the fact that, even when a practice is socially dangerous, it 
may be individually advantageous, as with the individuals who reap profits from a 
jingoism resulting in great misery to the group.”65 
To make matters worse, in the digital twenty-first century, there is arguably 
a third-order instinctual habitat that cues Burke’s “occupational” second-order 
instinct to fall back on racism. Media scholar Luke Munn writes that racism and 
misogyny “might be facilitated . . . by hate-inducing architectures”66 found in social 
media, streaming video sites, and search engine recommendation systems. For 
example, he singles out YouTube video recommendations, which have been shown 
to “often move from mainstream content to more incendiary media, or politically 
from more centrist views to right and even far-right ideologies.”67 While Munn is 
concerned about this algorithmic habitat’s insidious generation of “angry and 
radicalized individual[s]” who plunge down conspiratorial rabbit holes and never 
come back, he finds it “equally troubling [that] a broader, more unseen population of 
users [is] gradually being exposed to more hateful material.”68 What he finds so 
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jarring about this architecture “is its automatic and step-wise quality. Users do not 
consciously have to select the next video, nor jump suddenly into extreme material. 
Instead, there is a slow progression, allowing [them] to acclimate to these views 
before smoothly progressing onto the next step into their journey.”69 If his 
assessment holds water, the slippery slope from relatively indifferent witnesses to a 
volatilized captive audience may be better lubricated than conventional wisdom 
dictates. 
This particular technologization of witnessing results in the incremental 
amplification of incendiary racist content, which may, he worries, exert an insidious 
effect on the views of countless impressionable young people. Characterizing such 
exposures as less of a “zombie bite” than a slow-moving mold spore, Munn speculates 
that “this force is not an instant contagion, but something far more drawn out and 
subtle, a quiet influence that alters individuals as they inhabit online spaces over the 
months and years.”70 He therefore insists that we, as a civilization, examine and 
reprogram the categorical imperatives that our media architecture obeys. If we do 
not intervene on its human-engineered engagement-maximizing strategies, we will 
have no opportunity to stave off its automated cascade of effects. 
 
Q, the Symptom71 
QAnon is one of many psycho-social recrudescences of machine-learning processes 
that analyze and orchestrate billions of demographic data points with a view to 
sustaining and monetizing user engagement. It is undoubtedly an unfair contest. At 
the human user scale of pattern recognition, we are constantly put in the paralytic 
position of adjudicating the cognitive and ethical valences of algorithmic 
infrastructure designed to mesmerize us while extracting our data like blood from a 
captive child’s vein. 
The arc of QAnon is a compelling case study in our digital atmosphere’s 
manifold contours, powers, and propensities. As a cultural phenomenon, QAnon is 
an uncanny doppelganger of activist media scholarship in that it represents a 
perverse remediation of the activist impulse to spring from hypermediated 
witnessing bubbles and make efficacious interventions on a world in peril. The 
irruption of Q’s quasi-Evental reactivist community calls for concerned observers to 
concoct strategies for rewiring moribund cultural circuits in the hope that 
 
69 Ibid., 6–7. 
70 Ibid., 7. 
71 Dean would likely go a step further and refer to Q as not so much a symptom of our media 
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malignant refractions of Enlightenment impulses can ultimately be conducted 
through more prismatically egalitarian, less psycho-tropic lenses. 
At least for the time being, it is people who invent and codify the broad 
commands that even the most protean algorithms follow to the letter. And this is 
cause for hope. The fact that corporations cynically obfuscate these commands is a 
far from insuperable problem. But this epistemic asymmetry–with corporate 
algorithms processing nearly limitless data points about users, who cognize relatively 
few–does call for a concerned citizenry to update its understanding of and demands 
from our media environment. After all, it would be naïve to assume that any 
semblance of the Enlightenment project would be possible until we pause to 
elucidate our own rhetorical, ecological, medial, and political training in relation to 
our technological habitat. 
Or maybe the arc of Enlightenment is an excessively rigid paradigm, a kind 
of philosophical psychosis whose time has come and gone. If so, this historical 
juncture compels us, more than ever, to conjure more versatile imaginaries around 
the possibility of a better world. In his recent writings on the COVID-19 pandemic, 
Slavoj Žižek proposes that the pressure cooker effect of the pandemic has 
engendered “a vast epidemic of ideological viruses which were lying dormant in our 
societies: fake news, paranoiac conspiracy theories, explosions of racism.” He cites an 
array of Trump’s psychotic immunizing remedies, like banning Muslims and 
building a wall around America, which betoken seemingly hard-wired trained 
incapacities at the highest level of government. These hateful misperceptions of the 
causes of and remedies for the current crises lead Žižek to wonder about an alterior 
philosophical-homeopathic approach. Perhaps what we should seek out is “another 
and much more beneficent ideological virus” which “will spread and hopefully infect 
us: the virus of thinking of an alternate society, a society beyond nation-state, a 
society that actualizes itself in the forms of global solidarity and cooperation.”72 At 
first blush, it registers as a perverse sentiment. But perhaps only a virus of the hive 
mind, an overdue recoding of our frazzled social software, harbours the potential to 
extricate us from our current infrastructural morass.  
 
72 Slavoj Žižek, Pandemic! COVID-19 Shakes the World (New York: OR Books, 2020), 39. 
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